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Language, Silence, and Mysticism
Abstract
This paper critically examines whether, and how, mystical insights can be conveyed in 
language. First, the problem of mystical ineffability is briefly presented: how, if at all, 
is it possible to express the supposedly transrational and transconceptual (non-dualis-
tic) mystical experience in rational and conceptual (dualistic) linguistic terms? Second, 
drawing on the Wittgensteinian distinction between “pointing” and “saying”, it is dem-
onstrated that language not only speaks (describes), but also acts (performs). In this 
sense, it is wrong to interpret mystical utterances as discursive utterances, because they 
do not refer to the mystical, but enact it. Yet unlike ordinary (negative or positive) perfor-
matives, which remain embedded in the conceptual framework, mystical utterances func-
tion as absolute negative performatives, i.e. as instances of radical de-conceptualisation. 
Finally, several means for expressing the inexpressible are outlined: two non-linguistic 
(silence and bodily act), and four linguistic (evocative non-sense, paradox, negation, 
and scriptural metaphor). The individual expressive forms are classified according to 
two mutually exclusive criteria: the criterion of consistency discloses whether, and to 
what extent, a given form is compatible with the original mystical experience, while the 
criterion of suggestivity shows how successful a given form is in addressing its recipient. 
It is argued that the two criteria form an elementary matrix for a better understanding 





1. Jacob’s ladder: Saying the unsayable
The	main	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	consider	whether,	and	to	what	extent,	mys-
tics,	whose	experiences	are	supposed	to	be	transrational	and	therefore	inef-




























discursive	 utterance,	 in	 that	 they	 do	 not	 refer	 to	 the	 mystical,	 but	 embody	







2. Buddha’s flower: The contours of ineffability
Let	us	 try	 to	approach	 the	problem	of	 ineffability	by	means	of	 the	 famous	



































The	academic	 study	of	mysticism	 is	 fraught	
with	 disagreement	 and	 controversy,	 so	 it	 is	
almost	impossible	to	provide	a	“theoretically	
neutral”	 definition	 of	 mysticism	 and	 mysti-
cal	experience.	 In	what	 follows,	 I	will	draw	
on	my	previous	work	 on	 the	 subject,	where	
the	 following	 (tentative)	 definition	 of	 mys-
tical	 experience	 was	 advanced:	 “The	 most	
prominent	characteristic	of	‘mystical	experi-
ence	 proper’	 seems	 to	 be	 the breakdown of 
the subject-object dichotomy,	i.e.	of	the	sense	
of	 my being	 separated	 from	 the world.	This	
breakdown,	where	both	‘the	self’	(interiority)	
and	‘the	world’	(exteriority)	are	extinguished	
or	 transcended,	 is	 normally	 associated	 with	
the	 experience	 of	 oneness and/or	 nothing-
ness,	and	entails	a	radical transformation of	
one’s	 state	 and	manner	 of	 being.	 [The	 term	
‘mystical	 experience’	 thus	 covers]	 a	 whole 








of	 the	 spectrum	we	 find	 experiences	 where	







where	 mystical	 experiences	 are	 developed,	




and	 existential	 transformations	 associated	
with	mystical	experiences	[cf.	18].	Although	
individual	 practices,	 beliefs,	 etc.	 may	 differ	
from	one	 religio-cultural	 context	 to	 another,	
they	bring	about	the	same	type	of	experience.	
Particularly	important,	and	in	need	of	special	
mention	 in	 this	 context,	 are	 meditative/con-
templative practices	 that	 are	 considered	 to	
play	a	particularly	important	role	in	the	over-





















and	 your	 offspring. I	 am	with	 you	 and	will	
watch	over	you	wherever	you	go,	and	I	will	





‘How	 awesome	 is	 this	 place!	 This	 is	 none	
other	than	the	house	of	God;	this	is	the	gate	






































is	 that	 it	means	at	 least	“that	something	is	 in	some	way	not	communicable	
with	words”	(ibid.).	But	why?	What	is	about	the	mystical	that	cannot	be	put	
into	and	brought	forth	by	words?	It	is	our	contention	that	the	main	reason	for	













isolate	 the	 item	 under	 consideration	 by	 contrasts	 and	 comparisons”	 (ibid.:	











Jones	 calls	 the	 combination	 of	 differentiation	 and	 objectification,	 coupled	























emotional,	 etc.	 conditionings	 which	 serve	 as	 a	 fundamental	 interpretative	
framework	of	human	beings	in	their	relations	with	the	world.	And	it	is	pre-
cisely	these	structures	that	become	un-learned	(“de-automatised”	[Deikman	
1963,	 1966])	 in	mystical	 experience.	What	 is	more,	mystical	 insight	 tran-
scends	even	–	and	foremost!	–	the	fundamental	dichotomy	between	the	sub-





Second,	 in	order	 to	measure	 the	 scope	of	 language	and	determine	whether	
there	might	be	any	“points	of	contact”	between	“the	effable”	and	“the	inef-
fable”,	we	will	 try	 to	 identify	 these	points	against	 the	background	of	what	
Jones	refers	to	as	“grammatical	realism”.	In	other	words,	we	intend	to	look	












3. The conceptual crack: Of pointing and saying
One	of	Wittgenstein’s	most	famous	propositions	(5.6)	reads:	“The	limits	of	
my	language	mean	the	limits	of	my	world”.	Yet	how	far	do	these	limits	ac-
tually	 extend?	Tractatus	 opens	with	 the	 proposition	 (1):	 “The	world	 is	 all	
that	is	the	case”,	where	the	expression	“that	is	the	case”	denotes	“totality	of	
4
Note	 that,	 in	what	 follows,	we	focus	explic-
itly	 on	 the	 “early”	Wittgenstein	 (epitomised	
in	 his	 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus);	 for	
an	interesting	account	of	religious	experience	



































understanding	of	 the	word	 is	 related	 to	 the	proposition	(6.52)	which	reads:	
“We	feel	that	when	all	possible	scientific	questions	have	been	answered,	the	







context	of	science,	Leibniz’s	famous	question	asking	why there is something 
rather than nothing	remains	unanswered.	If,	however,	we	can	speak	merely	






































































“I	 do”,	 (m)uttered	 at	 the	 altar.	Once	 (m)uttered,	 it	 drastically	 changes	 our	



















It	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 certain	 structural	 similarity	 between	 per-








act	 only	 if	 I	 know	what	 it	means	 to	 “get	married”,	 “become	 a	man/wife”,	
etc.	Similarly,	the	phrase	“I’m	leaving	you”	only	rings	a	bell	if	I	know	what	




conceptual	framework,	“mystical	performatives”	disentangle the very act of 
entanglement,	i.e.	they	sever	the	performative	dimension	of	a	language	from	
its	descriptive	dimension.	In	this	sense,	mystical	“pointing”	might	be	termed	








loosens	 the	 grip	 of	 rational	 structures	 and	 enables	 the	 primordial	 mystical	
non-duality	to	“shine	through”,	wherefore	mystical	literature	from	different	
religious	traditions	can,	despite	vast	differences	in	dogmatic	wordings,	enact	























rather	–	 as	 already	pointed	out	 by	Otto	 in	his	 classical	 study	of	numinous	
experiences	(Otto	1958)	–	in	and	through	experience.	It	evokes	it,	i.e.	re-cre-
ates	 and	 re-enacts	 it	 here-and-now.	Now	we	are	 finally	 able	 to	understand	












all	 subsequent	 linguistic	 forms.	 In	 analysing	 individual	 categories	we	will	
use	the	two	mutually	exclusive	parameters	of	consistency	and	suggestivity.	
In	order	 to	evoke	a	mystical	experience	it	 is	not	enough	for	 the	expressive	
























































The	 second	 non-verbal	 form	 that	 tries	 to	 remain	 consistent	with	 the	 origi-
























ence	 to	broader	 audience,	 she	 is	obliged	 to	 take	 recourse	 to	 language.	But	
what	linguistic	means	are	available	to	him?	The	first	expressive	form	of	the	




















etc.	The	Kena Upanishad	depicts	“the	final	 realisation”	with	 the	following	
words:
































hausting	 the	 semantic	 field	 of	 all	 alternatives	 (“everything	 and	 nothing”),	






(descriptive),	 but	 therefore	 less consistent	 (evocative),	 as	 it	 is	more	 firmly	
rooted	in	conceptuality	than	evocative	non-sense.



























serious	misinterpretations:	 when	 confronted	 with	 evocative	 non-sense	 and	
paradox,	one	immediately	“senses”	the	radical	otherness	of	the	mystical	(the	
















































dispersing	 faint	 glimmers	of	 the	mystical:	 “A	metaphor	used	 to	 communi-
cate	any	experience	only	becomes	clear	after	the	intended	experience	has	oc-
curred”	(Jones	1993:	121).
The	scriptural	metaphor	is	thus	 the most suggestive,	but	also	 the least con-
sistent	 of	 the	expressive	 forms:	on	 the	one	hand,	 and	because	of	 its	 “tran-
scendent	descriptivity”,	 it	may	serve	as	our	 first	contact	with	 the	mystical,	
but	on	the	other	hand,	the	non-mystical	mind	runs	the	danger	of	identifying	
6
The	 term	 ‘scriptural’	 does	 not	 necessarily	
relate	 to	 the	Christian	Bible,	 but	 is,	 follow-
ing	 Uršič,	 used	 as	 “a	 ‘typified’	 label	 for	 a	
discourse	 on	 the	 Holy/Divine,	 which	 also	







the	 “thereafter”	with	 one	 of	 the	 “signposts”	 from	 the	 “hereafter”	 and	 thus	
fall	prey	to	idolatry	(if	appreciative	of	spirituality)	or	to	unreasonable	strug-
gles	with	a	straw	man	(if	critical	of	spirituality).	The	“spirit”	of	the	metaphor	



















(bodily	 act,	 evocative	non-sense,	 paradox,	 and	negation)	 lie	 somewhere	 in	
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Ovaj članak kritički ispituje mogu li i na koji način mogu mistički uvidi biti izraženi putem 
jezika. Prije svega se ukratko predstavlja problem mističke neizrecivosti: kako je moguće, ako 
je uopće moguće izraziti navodno transracionalna i transkonceptualna (nedualistička) mistična 
iskustva u racionalnim i konceptualnim (dualističkim) jezičnim terminima? Drugo, na temelju 
vitgenštajnovske razlike između »pokazivanja« i »govorenja«, pokazuje se da jezik ne samo go-
vori (opisuje) nego i djeluje (izvodi). U tom je smislu pogrešno interpretirati mističke iskaze kao 
diskurzivne iskaze jer oni ne označuju ono mistično, nego ga iznose. No za razliku od običnih 
(negativnih ili pozitivnih) performativa, koji ostaju ugrađeni u konceptualni okvir, mistički iska-
zi djeluju kao apsolutni negativni performativi, tj. kao instance radikalne de-konceptualizacije. 
Konačno je skicirano nekoliko načina za izricanje neizrecivog: dva nejezična (tišina i tjelesni 
čin) te četiri jezična (evokativna besmislica, paradoks, negacija i skripturalna metafora). Poje-
dine ekspresivne forme klasificirane su na temelju dvaju međusobno isključivih kriterija: kriterij 
konzistencije otkriva je li i u kojem je opsegu dana forma kompatibilna s originalnim mističnim 
iskustvom, dok kriterij sugestivnosti pokazuje koliko je dana forma uspješna u obraćanju njeno-
mu recipijentu. Tvrdi se da ova dva kriterija oblikuju osnovnu matricu za bolje razumijevanje 









Mahakashyapas Lächeln: Sprache, Stille und Mystizismus
Abstract
Der vorliegende Artikel untersucht kritisch, ob und auf welche Weise mystische Einsichten 
durch Sprache vermittelt werden können. Zuerst wird das Problem der mystischen Unausdrück-
barkeit kurz vorgestellt: Wie, wenn überhaupt, ist es möglich, die angeblich transrationalen und 
transkonzeptuellen (nicht dualistischen) mystischen Erfahrungen durch rationale und konzep-
tuelle (dualistische) linguistische Termini zum Ausdruck zu bringen? Zweitens, indem man auf 
wittgensteinsche Unterscheidung zwischen „Zeigen“ und „Sagen“ zurückgreift, wird darge-
legt, dass die Sprache nicht nur spricht (beschreibt), sondern auch handelt (ausführt). In dem 
Sinne ist es falsch, mystische Äußerungen als diskursive Äußerungen zu interpretieren, weil sie 
sich auf das Mystische nicht beziehen, sondern es darstellen. Doch im Gegensatz zu den ge-
wöhnlichen (negativen oder positiven) Performativen, die im konzeptuellen Rahmen eingebettet 
bleiben, funktionieren mystische Äußerungen als absolute negative Performative, d. h. als Ins-
tanzen radikaler De-konzeptualisierung. Schließlich werden mehrere Mittel zur Ausdrückung 
des Unausdrückbaren umrissen: zwei nicht sprachliche (Stille und körperlicher Akt) und vier 
sprachliche (evokativer Unsinn, Paradox, Negation sowie skripturale Metapher). Die einzelnen 
Ausdrucksformen werden nach zwei sich gegenseitig ausschließenden Kriterien klassifiziert: 
Das Kriterium der Konsistenz offenbart, ob und inwieweit die gegebene Form mit der ursprüng-
lichen mystischen Erfahrung kompatibel ist, während das Kriterium der Suggestivität zeigt, wie 
erfolgreich die gegebene Form bei der Auseinandersetzung mit ihrem Rezipienten ist. Es wird 
behauptet, dass diese zwei Kriterien eine elementare Matrix zum besseren Verständnis dessen 
bilden, wie mystische Erfahrung, trotz ihrer grundlegenden Transrationalität, in der Sprache 





Le sourire de Mahakashyapa : Langage, silence et mysticisme
Résumé
Cet article examine de manière critique si, et comment, la connaissance mystique peut se com-
muniquer par le langage. On présente d’abord le problème de l’ineffabilité mystique : comment, 
si du tout, est-il possible d’exprimer une expérience mystique transrationnelle et transconcep-
tuelle (non-dualiste) en termes linguistiques rationnels et conceptuels (dualistes) ? Deuxième-
ment, s’appuyant sur la distinction wittgensteinienne entre « montrer » et « dire », il est démon-
tré que le langage non seulement parle (décrit), mais également agit (se produit). Dans ce sens, 
il est faux d’interpréter l’énoncé mystique comme énoncé discursif car il ne se réfère pas au 
mystique, il l’énacte. Et pourtant à la différence des performatifs ordinaires, qui demeurent in-
corporés dans le cadre conceptuel, les énoncés mystiques fonctionnent comme des performatifs 
négatifs absolus, c’est-à-dire comme instances d’une dé-conceptualisation radicale. Enfin, sont 
exposés plusieurs moyens d’exprimer l’inexprimable : deux non-linguistiques (silence et acte 
corporel) et quatre linguistiques (non-sens évocateur, paradoxe, négation et métaphore scriptu-
rale). Les formes expressives individuelles sont classées selon deux critères qui s’excluent l’un 
et l’autre : le critère de consistance révèle si, et dans quelle mesure, une forme donnée est 
compatible avec l’expérience mystique originelle, tandis que le critère de suggestivité montre 
la réussite que connaît une forme donnée lorsqu’elle aborde son récepteur. On affirme que les 
deux critères forment une matrice élémentaire pour mieux comprendre comment l’expérience 
mystique, malgré sa transrationalité fondamentale, peut s’exprimer de manière cohérente dans 
le langage.
Mots-clés
mysticisme,	ineffabilité,	langage,	langage	performatif	vs	langage	descriptif,	philosophie	du	langage,	
philosophie	de	la	religion
